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Public Services in a “Post-Democratic Age” 
 An Alternative Framework to Network Governance 
 
Abstract 
This paper questions the continued dominance of the network governance approach in 
public policy and administration and proposes an alternative framework. It finds little 
evidence to support claims for a paradigmatic shift towards network governance in the 
English case. Neither does the evidence support claims for a weakening of vertical 
linkages or a strengthening of horizontal linkages within, or across, service delivery 
chains in the England. Instead bureaucratic and hierarchical structures remain 
pervasive and power remains highly centralised. The two case studies, of economic 
development and affordable housing provision, demonstrate how reforms are driven 
by elected politicians’ political objectives and their support of various target groups in 
society. Nevertheless, these objectives must be understood within the context of 
Crouch’s “post-democracy”  – essentially the exigencies of contemporary electoral 
politics and the pervasive influence of business. The study of public administration 
and management needs to refocus on the implications for the public services of post-
democracy and address critical questions of power, competing interests, mechanisms 
of exclusion and inclusion and contested claims to knowledge and expertise within 
service delivery chains.  
Key words: governance, public services, public service delivery chains, economic 
development, affordable housing. 
 
Introduction 
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The public management and administration literature is dominated by the network 
governance framework. This article questions this framework and argues that it fails 
to reflect the realities of policy and decision making in contemporary public services 
especially during a period of financial austerity. Over recent years the study of public 
administration has become narrowly focussed on technocratic and overly generalised 
explanations of governmental reorganisations in terms of a shift towards network 
governance and/or a ‘New Public Management’. In contrast the framework outlined 
here places vertical, hierarchical-type relationships – rather than horizontal, network 
relationships – at the centre of analysis, and stresses power relationships and 
competing interests rather than consensual decision-making. It also argues that service 
delivery reforms must be understood not in terms of generic trends towards 
governance but of the policy dynamics specific to particular services (for a similar 
argument in central-local relations, see Entwistle 2010) and particularly the dilemmas 
confronting policymakers. The two case studies illustrate how shifts in the design of 
service delivery chains are often intimately bound up with policymakers’ partisan 
political objectives and strategies. The service delivery chains in economic 
development and affordable housing provision were reformed first by the last Labour 
government (1997-2010) and then the present Coalition (Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat) government. As will be seen, these various sets of reform have their basis 
in fundamental issues of territorial and social distribution rather than a ‘governance’ 
trend or particular wave of New Public Management. 
 
A bureaucratic-governmental versus a network governance framework 
Contemporary public service structures have evolved significantly over recent years 
in the UK. Network governance advocates argue that these structures now reflect 
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organisational principles which differ significantly from those established in the 
immediate postwar period. They maintain that these changes are producing a 
‘paradigmatic’ shift or ‘a new process of governing; or a changed condition of 
ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed’ (Rhodes 1996: 652-3; 
Rhodes 2007; Chhotray and Stoker 2009; Sorensen and Torfing, 2006 and 2009). 
Their contentions are: (1) networks are eclipsing hierarchies or bureaucracies as the 
mode of coordination, in particular horizontal networks have grown in importance, 
and allow social actors considerable freedom to coordinate themselves with 
diminished central government involvement; (2) extra-governmental actors – 
increasingly involved in service delivery and from the nonprofit or private sectors – 
‘self-organise’ and acquire countervailing power requiring central government 
policymakers to collaborate rather than command them; and (3) central governments 
resort to ‘softer’ or indirect controls or even persuasion (Bell et al. 2010) as old 
‘command-and-control’, direct policy instruments fail to steer other social actors.  
 
However, the network governance stress on decentralised and horizontal power 
relationships misses the realities of contemporary public service delivery. Those 
realities necessitate a return to a bureaucratic-governmental framework. (1) Service 
delivery chains have indeed become more multi-organisational than was once the 
case. Nevertheless, power remains highly centralised as in the ‘asymmetric power 
model’ (Marsh et al, 2003, Marsh 2008, and Richards 2008). Public services are 
delivered through top-down institutionalised structures even despite apparently being 
‘de-bureaucratised’ or outside direct government control.  
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(2)  The assumption that the removal of bureaucratic structures necessarily gives rise 
to ‘self-organising networks’ is questionable. It assumes that local discretion can be 
guaranteed against powerful centripedal forces in the absence of clear policy and 
institutional frameworks. Moreover, although bureaucratic structures are often 
presented as oppressive, ‘regulating the poor’ in Piven and Cloward’s (1971) classic 
phrase, they can also protect the interests of deprived and dependent groups. Rights 
require uniform enforcement which is ‘rarely guaranteed without the presence of 
large, centralized bureaucracies capable of creating and enforcing them’ (Du Gay 
2005, p. 7). Yet the governance and public management literature tends to adopt the 
stance of popular management books by portraying ‘bureaucracy’ negatively, 
celebrating the heroic networking skills of public managers, their strategies and 
meeting ‘performance’ criteria, within a largely consensual and fluid, inter-
organisational world. The English Local Government Modernisation Agenda 
evaluation studies illustrate this tendency (for a review see Laffin, 2008).   
 
(3) The evidence that central governments are fundamentally modifying their control 
strategies is weak. In England the trend, at least in central-local relations, has been in 
the reverse direction (X, 2008; Wilson 2002). Central policymakers are indeed 
increasingly ‘governing through governance’ but using extra-governmental 
organisations to evade local political ‘interference’ in service delivery (Bache 2003, p. 
312; see also Ball 2008). Pike and Tomaney (2009, p. 29) note that to interpret 
Labour’s regional governance of economic development in England “as decentred, 
networked and plural forms of governance replete with diverse varieties of spatial-
institutional entities appears to downplay the shadow of the national state and the 
instrumental role of pushing down responsibility for economic development to lower 
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level institutions without concomitant shifts in authority and resources.” Similarly, 
although social housing delivery mostly now involves many nonprofit organisations 
managed through a regulatory system, this system represents a centralisation or 
nationalisation of housing services (Xa, forthcoming).  
 
The next section outlines an alternative framework for understanding recent changes 
in public administration, stressing the internal structures of service delivery chains 
and producer-user relationships. The middle section analyses how two contrasting 
service delivery chains have changed under the previous Labour government (1997-
2010) and now under the Coalition (Conservative and Liberal Democrat) government 
(2010 onwards). These two case studies provide evidence of the continued 
significance of formal organisations and the political tensions underlying service 
delivery reorganisations and how these tensions differ across policy sectors. The final 
section, then, sums up the argument. The paper draws on a small pilot project, 
supported under the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council Connected 
Communities Programme. The project involved a literature review of recent public 
management literature and, in particular, the literature on specific public services 
which the mainstream public management literature has neglected. Two workshops 
were held during 2011 to explore the Coalition Government’s policy agenda, focussed 
on economic development and housing (but not exclusively). About 40 senior 
practitioners attended each workshop from local government, central government, 
former regional governance bodies, private sector, and voluntary and community 
sector practitioners. The first was held in the North East of England to capture a 
regional perspective, and the second was a national workshop hosted by the Local 
Government Information Unit. Participants discussed relating changes to their 
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respective service delivery chains, including the removal of regional structures and 
the localism agenda, their impact, the place of their organisations in relevant delivery 
chains and policy-influencing strategies.  
 
Analytical framework: service delivery chains, pathways to influence and 
mechanisms of representation  
‘Network’ has become such a pervasive term as to be almost meaningless (e.g. John 
1998, 85-86; Hill and Hupe 2011). ‘Network’ has long been used as an analytical 
concept. What is still one of the best examples of applying network analysis (Friend et 
al. 1974) is now almost 40 years old, tellingly Friend’s analysis gives priority to 
vertical relationships. Essentially ‘network’ refers to relationships or means of social 
coordination which are neither hierarchical nor market-like but are more informal and 
rest on cooperation and trust, emphasising horizontal rather than vertical relationships. 
Governance theorists stress the capacity of networks to ‘self-organise’ and develop 
their own policies independently of central policymakers (e.g. Rhodes 1996, 2007).  
 
The network governance literature assumes a pluralist model of the state. Power is 
assumed to be fragmented with policy outcomes emerging from competition among 
many interest groups, none of which enjoy overarching control over more than quite 
limited areas of social concern, while citizens enjoy fairly easy access to 
policymakers. These pluralistic assumptions have been widely criticised for 
understating governments’ capacity to control decision-making by 
excluding/including groups, defining the policy agenda and restructuring the state 
machinery. Critics of governance theory note how it masks ‘traditional social science 
concerns with conflicting interests and logics’ (such as Walters, 2004: Hill and Hupe 
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2011) and assumes a pluralistic, political inclusiveness and neglects questions of 
social redistribution and politically dependent minorities (Ingram et al. 2007; Xa, 
forthcoming). The analysis here starts from Crouch’s (2004) idea of “post-
democracy”. ‘Post-democracy’ refers to ‘a stress on ‘electoral participation as the 
main type of mass participation, extensive freedom for lobbying activities, which 
mainly means business lobbies, and a form of polity that avoids interfering with a 
capitalist economy. It is a model which has little interest in widespread citizen 
involvement or the role of organizations outside the business sector’ (Crouch 2004, p. 
3). He argues that ‘the political class ‘wants as much as possible to exclude the mass 
of citizens from becoming actively involved in probing its secrets, organizing 
oppositional activities, disturbing the tight control exercised by the politico-business 
ellipse’ (2004, p. 112). In particular, large corporations have become dominant and 
are displacing governmental hierarchies and even markets (Crouch 2004 and 2012). 
The post-democracy thesis is important in highlighting key aspects of policymakers’ 
political and economic context plus the emergence of new, extra-governmental 
producer groups within the welfare state which have at least the potential to change 
the politics of collective consumption. 
 
However, government policy cannot be understood simply in terms of electoral 
exigencies and business interests. As the two case studies will illustrate, some Labour 
ministers did seek to pursue redistributive ends and build in representative 
mechanisms and organisational structures – such as the regional development 
agencies and National Tenants Voice – to counterbalance the interests of deprived and 
dependent groups against the South East business lobby and the large bureaucratic 
housing providers. The Conservative-led Coalition government, then, abolished these 
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structures largely in the interests of austerity politics and strengthening business 
interests.  
 
Vertical, service delivery chains, then, form the analytical starting-point rather than 
networks. ‘Service delivery chains’ refer to the vertical relationships within 
governmental organisations, in inter-governmental relationships and between 
government and those extra-governmental organisations involved in service delivery. 
These chains embrace both more traditional, bureaucratic structures – where central 
policymakers have formalised, hierarchical control over the chain and the providers 
are controlled through direct employment – and chains where policymakers, at least 
ostensibly, control extra-governmental producers through commissioning or 
contracting-out. Chains reflect, too, the characteristically departmentalised or “silo-
ed” nature of UK central government which persists despite efforts to ‘join-up’ 
government (Ling 2002, Davies 2009). Arguably contracting-out reinforces vertical 
structures as it cannot easily, if at all, accommodate more than a single departmental 
commissioner or purchaser; although very little research has been conducted on the 
relationship between contracting-out and joined-up government to substantiate such 
contentions. The framework presented here distinguishes, for analytical purposes, 
between the internal management of such chains – involving policy frameworks or 
guidance, multiple accountabilities and structural appreciation, (based on Friend et al., 
1974; Friend, 1977) – and their external relationships, including the management of 
mechanisms of representation (MoRs) and emergence of pathways to influence (PtI). 
 
Service delivery chains (1): policy frameworks, multiple accountabilities and 
structural appreciation 
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Firstly, policy frameworks denote the formal rules and guidelines constituting 
government policy in a delivery chain. Frameworks vary across services in terms of 
how tightly they are defined. Those services involving specific entitlements – such as 
unemployment benefits, social security and housing benefits – are highly rule-bound 
with only limited discretion allowed to frontline staff. Thus frontline compliance is 
largely unproblematic. One powerful underlying dynamic, creating tendencies 
towards the nationalisation of service standards, is the public expectation that each 
citizen will receive a similar service regardless of where they live to prevent a 
‘postcode lottery’ for public service users. In other services, policy frameworks are 
less prescriptive. Those making the decisions at the ‘local’ level, usually 
professionals, are allowed considerable discretion. For example, land-use planners 
and their elected members have considerable scope to consider the location and type 
of housing and other facilities within general planning policy guidance. Another 
example is child protection. Social workers have to be given some discretion to assess 
children and families and manage their workloads given that assessments about 
complex family relationships are not susceptible to the straightforward application of 
pre-formed decision rules. However, a long series of child abuse scandals led to a 
tightening up of these rules and stronger monitoring regimes, but these are now being 
seen as obstructing rather than promoting effective child abuse detection and 
prevention by absorbing social workers’ time in compliance and leaving little room 
for local interpretation and implementation (White at al., 2010; Purcell and Chow, 
2011, p.407). 
 
Secondly, decision-makers in chains face multiple accountabilities where major 
stakeholders and other elected levels of government are involved. Again the more 
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frontline delivery requires the application of bureaucratic rules to an easily 
understandable situation, the simpler will be the lines of accountability. However, 
once other levels of, especially elected, government are involved these lines become 
more complex. For example, the local government chain of accountability – with 
officers accountable to elected members who are, in turn, accountable to the local 
electorate – has been weakened with pressure towards greater responsiveness upwards 
to central government (as local authorities have come under pressure to respond to 
central messages, especially where inspectors are active, Downe and Martin, 2006). 
Similarly, the greater involvement of extra-governmental providers means that the 
relationships of accountability become contract, not employment based, especially as 
contemporary policymakers often see the former as giving them greater effective 
control. However, although horizontal links appear to have grown in number, the 
existence of such links is not itself evidence that horizontal links are displacing 
vertical power relationships. They may simply be necessary local adjustments 
between actors otherwise locked into centrally-driven service delivery chains.  
 
Thirdly, ‘structural appreciation’ refers to the interpretation or understanding of the 
pattern of relationships underlying the problems which the delivery chain is perceived 
as tackling. The term refers to how the causal relationships are understood by those in 
the chains, especially but not only by the professionals involved, such as the causal 
relationships between firms applying for government support and their markets; 
between future demographic shifts and the type and location of housing; between 
family members prior to social work interventions. Structural appreciation can lead to 
arguments which conflict with those based on guidelines. Policy frameworks stress 
“certain general characteristics of entities which constitute cases   and for decision, 
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and seek to impose some general classification on them (‘equal treatment for all 
school children of type X’, ‘all firms of type Y’ …), considerations of structure 
emphasise relationships which are unique to a particular case (‘the family 
environment of this disturbed child’, ‘the importance of a specific company to a 
locality’ …)” (Friend 1977). Thus SDCs involve decision-makers having to analyse 
situations before they can apply the policy frameworks which are essentially about 
classifying situations. Of course, too, people’s understanding of causal relationships 
can differ considerably reflecting their territorial and/or organisational location, past 
socialisation and particularly professional socialisation. Those at the frontline, or 
street-level, often perceive their realities as being very different from how those 
realities are perceived at the next level upwards (Lipsky 1980). Typically those lower 
down the chain see their locally-defined problems as failing to match centrally-
defined problems and solutions, especially when marked territorial differences exist 
and when they have to work across vertically-segmented service chains. For example, 
in housing those in the North East argued that the Coalition’s national housing policy 
framework reflected the realities of housing shortage in the South East rather than the 
North East realities of a deteriorating housing stock. Central policymakers themselves 
also cannot assume that local managers have the necessary technical knowledge to 
enact or even to understand new policies, the latter have frequently to learn a range of 
‘often new and detailed techniques’ to implement often ambiguous policy directives 
(Schofield 2004, p. 283). Cognitive obstacles also exist to citizen participation and to 
bringing local communities into the policy process. For instance, the local knowledge 
accessed through consultation can be dismissed in a planning system which 
selectively ‘privileges scientific and technical knowledge’ over other types of 
knowledge and evidence (Sandercock, 1998, p.5; Bishop, 2010). Similarly, those at 
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the local level are reluctant to ‘translate their values and epistemologies into the frame 
of legitimacy required by the planning system’ (Anderson, 2008, p.286).  
 
Service delivery chains (2): mechanisms of representation and pathways to 
influence 
‘Mechanisms of representation’ (MoRs) refer to the formalised and recognised means 
of reflecting the interests and concerns of those involved, the stakeholders, in 
delivering and receiving services within a chain. The official justification is that 
citizens’ interests should be represented through mechanisms supplementing 
representative democracy. Their design is necessarily an act of political-bureaucratic 
management. They can be used as means of co-opting potential dissent, securing 
legitimacy, policy learning through consultation and often as a mix of all three. A 
critical, and sometimes, contentious question is who is or is not a ‘stakeholder’ to be 
‘represented’. Policymakers typically seek to include certain groups but exclude 
others through implementing rules of consultation and defining what types of 
behaviour are, and are not, ‘respectable’ or legitimate (Dearlove 1973).  
 
Meanwhile, those involved in the chain, either as providers or service users, typically 
seek to organise themselves to advance and protect their interests by pressing for 
recognition in an existing or new representative mechanism. Both sides have to find 
ways of legitimating these different claims for involvement and the language of 
representation provides them with the necessary justification. Yet all claims to 
representation are ‘partial and contestable’ (Saward, 2005, p. 182), ‘representation is 
not a fact, but rather a process that involves the making of claims to be 
representative.’ (Saward 2005, p. 184). These claims to ‘representativeness’ extend 
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beyond justifications simply in terms of links with ‘the formal line of democratic 
delegation’ (2005, p. 192). This view of representation also raises questions about the 
representativeness of representation, namely how equality and difference are 
incorporated into the process of participation, particularly those groups that are 
effectively ‘hidden or excluded from the mainstream of civic life’ (Gyford, 1991, p.2).  
 
Those affected by a particular chain – as producers, users or others with some other 
interests at stake – often (but certainly not always) act strategically and actively seek 
out those with access to power. The selection of a particular pathway reflects the type 
of policy or service, the channels available, the possible available coalitions of actors 
and the inclinations of the actors themselves. Conlan and Posner (2011) identify four 
“Pathways to influence” – the partisan and symbolic which typically involve 
mobilising mass public support (usually involving elected politicians pursuing 
electoral advantage). In contrast, in the expert and pluralist pathways “policy making 
is seen largely as a process of adjustment among contending organized interests” 
(2011, p. 10) but with the former involving expert knowledge and professional-
bureaucratic channels.  
 
The earlier public policy literature stressed the issues raised by the presence of 
professional producer group interests within government typically working through 
insider policy communities (e.g. Jordan and Richardson, 1978) or the expert 
pathways. Policy communities, typical of the early postwar period, give policy access 
to some actors but exclude others. These traditional producer-based policy 
communities have declined in significance across most policy sectors but ministers 
and political parties have taken up the policymaking slack rather than open and 
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inclusive policy networks (Richardson, 2000; X, forthcoming). New extra-
governmental producer group interests have now emerged – in the private sector, 
around companies such as SERCO and CAPITA, and in the nonprofit sector, 
especially around the major charities which have increasingly professionalised their 
lobbying activities. Their interests differ from those of the traditional professional-
bureaucratic interests (which are losing their role as traditional policy communities 
have largely disappeared). As these new extra-government organisations take over 
more services within market or ‘quasi-market’ conditions, new issues of control and 
accountability are raised as Crouch argues in his post-democracy thesis. Regulatory 
systems have necessarily had to be introduced to maintain government control, to 
protect users made vulnerable when services are taken outside direct government 
control (for example regulating social landlords in the interests of tenants through the 
former Tenant Services Authority) and even providers (the TSA also protected private 
investors’ interests in housing associations).  
 
Two delivery chains: economic development and affordable housing  
This final section examines two service delivery chains through the contrasts and 
similarities between how Labour and then the Coalition government have sought to 
redesign and manage them. The Coalition’s main policy aims, relevant to service 
chains, are outlined first and the two cases then examined. 
  
The Coalition government’s stated aims to re-engineer service delivery chains can be 
summed up under five headings. The Big Society refers to the creation of a new state-
individual relationship, involving ‘a new focus on empowering individuals, families 
and communities to take control of their lives’ (Cameron, 2009; Kisby 2010), 
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although the idea is already losing its prominence in the Coalition’s policy agenda. 
The assumption is that if government withdraws a service, if that service is really 
necessary, local communities themselves will organise to provide it and do so without 
the requiring the prescriptive policy frameworks characteristic of Labour government 
(Norman 2010). Meanwhile government will look to alternative, extra-governmental 
means of delivering those public services it retains. However, despite the rhetoric the 
government has given the contracts to firms like SERCO and CAPITA rather than 
charities, often apparently after lobbying from the former which are emerging as new 
producer group interests. Under the Localism Agenda the Government has pledged to 
devolve power to local communities, promising “powerful new incentives for local 
people so they support development in the right places and receive direct rewards 
from the proceeds of growth to improve their local areas” (DCLG, 2010). Meanwhile 
public sector delayering is removing “unnecessary”, intermediate levels of 
government, particularly regional governance structures. As many services are being 
contracted-out mostly to large private sector service companies, these contracts are 
based on payment-by-results (PBR) to ensure government obtains value-for-money. 
Substantial cutbacks are being imposed across the public sector with the UK facing 
some of the deepest spending cuts among the advanced economies (Taylor-Gooby 
and Stoker, 2011, p. 6). The Department of Communities and Local Government will 
have lost 33 per cent of its administration budget by 2015 (Conrad, 2010), while local 
government is facing planned expenditure cuts of over a quarter between 2010 and 
2014-15 (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker 2011, p. 8). Meanwhile, the voluntary and 
community sector will lose an estimated 7.7% of income from central and local 
government, receiving £911 million less in 2015/16 than in 2010/11 despite the Big 
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Society rhetoric (NCVO, 2011). Such extensive cuts raise serious questions over the 
viability of the localism and Big Society agendas (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012, p.22). 
 
(1) Economic Development and the Politics of Territorial Redistribution 
The UK is characterised by deepening territorial inequalities, originating from the 
inter-war decline of Northern industrial economies and the economic growth driven 
by financial services in the South East and London (McCarthy et al, 2012, p.126).  
Successive central governments have established regional government institutions in 
England designed to tackle these inequalities through the relocation of economic 
activity and latterly with a focus on stimulating local growth and employment in 
declining areas (Murphy and Caborn, 1996; McCarthy et al, 2012; Pike et al, 2012). 
However, in terms of articulating a political voice regional identities vary 
significantly across England (Tomaney, 2002, p. 728), the Northern regions do have 
some identity but the South East has almost no regional identity (John et al, 2002, 
p.738) .  
 
The last Labour government sought to correct the relative economic decline of the 
North and appease Northern Labour MPs, who feared the economic consequences of 
Scottish devolution, by introducing a well-defined and institutionalised, central-
regional-local, delivery chain in economic development. An attempt to introduce 
elected Regional Assemblies foundered during the first Labour government following 
an unsuccessful referendum (Shaw and Robinson, 2007, p. 244). Nonetheless, Labour 
developed devolved administrative structures exemplified by the Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) launched in 1998.  The RDAs were charged with 
developing and executing a regional strategy. Each RDA was led by a board 
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regionally nominated, but appointed by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. 
Their strategy was overseen by an indirectly nominated Regional Assembly, 
comprising representatives from local government, the private and voluntary sectors, 
which was also responsible for preparing a statutory regional land use plan and 
coordinating the strategies of other government departments.  
 
Underlying this devolved economic development and spatial planning approach was a 
concern to resolve North-South imbalances. Labour ministers faced a tension between 
seeking to correct the poor economic performance of Labour’s Northern heartlands 
and maintaining the competitiveness of the South-East, seen as the economic 
locomotive of the UK economy threatened by increasing congestion and the 
constraints on labour mobility imposed by rising house prices. Tackling Northern 
regional imbalances was more prominent under the Deputy Prime Minister, John 
Prescott, than under later Labour Ministers who, while also representing Northern 
constituencies, gave greater weight to Southern electoral prospects and South Eastern 
competitiveness in their decision making (which promised greater electoral and 
economic returns), hence the emphasis on national strategies of technology, 
innovation and skills (Pike and Tomaney, 2009; X forthcoming). 
 
Regional Government Offices (GOs) formed the other main part of the regional 
architecture. The then Conservative government had created the GOs in 1994 as a 
pragmatic response to the need to have regional-level institutions as vehicles for 
administering EU Structural Funds and to improve territorial coordination by bringing 
together central departments’ regional offices (Spencer and Mawson, 1998). The GOs 
administered polices on behalf of Whitehall departments, sought to work with 
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regional and local partners to set strategic priorities, monitor performance, and act as 
a policy and performance feedback loop between the centre and the localities (Pearce 
and Mawson, 2007, p. 636). GOs also had a role in generating policy information, 
including engaging regional and local partners in dialogue about the future of their 
region, and commissioning regional economic research (Mawson and Spencer, 1998, 
p. 80). The GOs were potentially key in explaining ‘local policy to the centre’ and 
lobbying in a ‘non-conformist way’, acting as the voice of the region in Whitehall 
(Mcmillan and Massey, 2001, p.27; Mawson, 2007). In reality their role largely 
involved coopting local and other subnational government units, agencies and 
business into the implementation of national public policy rather than acting as an 
independent regional voice (McMillan and Massey, 2001, p. 27; Pearce et al, 2008, 
p.443). Thus their role as MoRs was restricted, ‘where they [did] represent regional 
preferences it [was] in the form of an evaluation-loop, feeding back to the parent 
departments the practical experience of implementing policy at subnational level’ 
(McMillan and Massey, 2001, p.27).  
 
Under Labour these regional institutions involved a range of MoRs for local 
politicians, business people, trade unionists, voluntary and community groups. 
Whether these MoRs amounted to an effective regional representative level is 
questionable given the absence of a regionally-elected element. Yet, as some 
commentators have argued, the existence of the RDAs in the north at least meant that 
they acted as, what might be called, ‘countervailing bureaucracies’, having a policy 
development and relationship-building capacity at the regional level, to the national 
bureaucracies of Whitehall (Danson and Lloyd, 2012). The Coalition government 
abolished this regional architecture, and vitally the regional-level RDAs. They have 
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been replaced with a loose delivery chain based on a new ‘sub-regional’ level 
(incidentally illustrating the fluidity of intermediate governmental boundaries in 
England (Cochrane, 2012, p. 201). Thirty-nine Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) 
have replaced the nine RDAs at the ‘sub-regional’ level, for example the North East 
RDA has been replaced by two LEPS (one for Tyneside and another for Teeside). 
Ministers have rejected the idea of LEPs as having representative roles. Ostensibly the 
LEP policy framework leaves considerable scope for sub-regional actors to determine 
how a LEP should function – how they will organise themselves (except that their 
chairs and at least half their boards must comprise business representatives), their 
administrative support and who should be included. In reality their size and limited 
resources mean they lack the capacity embodied in the RDAs to counter, at the ‘sub-
regional’ level, London’s policy dominance. LEPs have also displaced the 
appreciative systems of the experts and bureaucrats, who formed part of the RDA’s 
capacity, with those of business. LEPs, then, represent a redefinition, as well as a 
weakening, of the intermediate level between central and local (Pugalis and Townsend 
2012). The loss of regional institutions reflects the Coalition’s pursuit of delayering 
and cuts as well as the long-standing Conservative hostility towards regional 
government, illustrated by their boycott of Labour’s Regional Select Committees (and 
now abandoned). This hostility also reflects an underlying politics of redistribution as 
the Conservative authorities around London resisted pressure under Labour to 
increase levels of house-building (see next section).  
 
LEPs mark a sharp change in the policy definition of ‘economic development’ from a 
focus on regeneration (encompassing issues of deprivation with an underlying 
redistributive intent) and intervention, to a focus on promoting opportunity, enterprise 
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and ‘trickle down’ economics without major interventions or the major resource 
commitment implicit in the former Regional Development Agencies. Instead of 
Labour’s formalised regional-central structures, with their MoRs, LEPs are more 
informal and composed of business people. LEPs, too, fall short of being 
countervailing bureaucracies. It could be argued that that they contribute to 
centralisation for their limited organisational capacity and vague policy 
responsibilities limit their ability to challenge central government. Thus the 
decentralisation promised by LEPs was ‘offset by marked centralisation’ with several 
activities once led by RDAs, such as inward investment, innovation, and management 
of EU funds, being centralised in Whitehall (McCarthy et al, 2012).  
 
As the MoRs have been removed, those beyond the centre now face difficulties in 
identifying contacts in central government, that is finding pathways to influence 
central government policymakers. Despite the continuing need to secure geographical 
coordination of policy and delivery mechanisms within and between government 
departments, senior civil servants have been markedly reluctant to fill the void and 
where necessary have resorted to communication on a ‘below the radar’ and informal 
basis.  The bottom up linkages in many policy areas have become much more 
piecemeal and, in the sphere of economic development, dependent on LEP actors’ 
skills in making connections upwards with politicians and officials within central 
government.  The picture is one of a fragmented and sub-optimal set of central-local 
relations in comparison with that which prevailed previously (this paragraph draws on 
the discussions in the two workshops). 
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(2) Social housing: The territorial politics of social redistribution and the role of 
the public service user  
This discussion focusses on Labour’s two key reforms of affordable housing service 
delivery, reforms which the Coalition has now mostly dismantled: (1) the 
development of regional planning machinery for house-building underpinned by 
targets and (2) the introduction of a new regulatory system for social housing (this 
section draws heavily on Xa and Xb, forthcoming). Firstly, Labour ministers sought 
to promote affordable house-building through the regional planning machinery. They 
fixed regional housing targets, including specific allocations for social housing 
provision, which were cascaded down from the regional level to local authorities. In 
2008 this delivery chain was restructured with the abolition of the former Housing 
Corporation and English Partnerships. The new Homes and Communities Agency 
(HCA) and the Tenant Services Authority (TSA) replaced these bodies, based on a 
new distinction within the delivery chain between investment (HCA) and regulation 
(TSA). Labour ministers and their advisers largely designed the HCA to reinforce 
their capacity to impose their policy direction. A key policy direction was to increase 
house-building in the South-East to improve housing affordability and prevent high 
housing costs constraining the economic dynamism of England’s most prosperous 
region. The Conservatives strongly opposed the creation of the HCA. The then 
Shadow Housing Minister criticised the ‘top-down, centrally-driven approach’ of the 
‘unaccountable Homes and Communities Agency’ which would allow it ‘in 
conjunction with the unelected regional development agencies, to ride roughshod over 
local communities, [and] take further powers away from democratically-elected local 
authorities and place them in the hands of politically-appointed Homes and 
Communities Agency officials’ (HC Deb 27 November 2007 c145). The 
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Conservatives had already used the supposed threat of ‘concreting over the south-
east’, which they claimed would be the consequence of regional house-building 
targets, as an electoral card during the 2005 election in South-Eastern marginal 
constituencies.  
 
Very early in government the Coalition Government declared their intention to 
abolish Labour’s house-building targets under strong pressure from their local 
councillors and suburban members across South-East England. Many Conservative 
authorities immediately lowered their planned housing provision. Most commentators 
assume that removing housing targets is likely to lead to reduced housing completions 
(e.g. Rydin, 2011, p. 34). More recently, under pressure from developers, the 
government has announced plans to encourage house-building in general terms but 
not to plan such building strategically across the country and certainly not return to 
Labour’s targets plus specific allocations for social housing provision.  
 
Those in the Northern English housing authorities and associations largely saw the 
HCA policy framework as based on producing affordable housing in Southern 
England, whereas in the North the pressing issues surrounded housing regeneration 
and bringing empty homes back into use. Meanwhile the National Housing Federation 
(the housing association trade body) only represents housing associations and thus has 
limited claims to be more widely representative. Those who are homeless or unable to 
afford better housing are left unrepresented. Their interests are pursued by (to some 
extent) the NHF and organisations like Shelter who lobby government on behalf of 
these unrepresented groups and seek to use pathways to influence. An important 
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finding of the pilot research was that many larger associations were looking for ways 
of developing such pathways. 
 
Secondly, Labour also reformed social housing provision by speeding up the transfer 
of council housing stock into the non-profit housing association sector and then 
reformed the social housing regulatory system. The stock transfer policy was driven 
by ministers’ disillusionment with local authorities as social landlords plus the 
pressing need to invest heavily in repairing the council housing stock by leveraging in 
more private sector investment through the associations (Xa forthcoming). Prior to 
2008 the Housing Corporation was the main regulator of the nonprofit housing 
associations which, by then, had become the key delivery agencies – responsible for 
managing just over a half of English social housing and, even more significantly, 
constructing almost all new social housing as local authorities had largely ceased to 
build council housing. The Corporation’s functions were divided between the 
investment and grant allocation functions, which were given to the HCA, and the 
regulatory functions which went to the new Tenant Services Authority (TSA). The 
TSA both guaranteed the private sector investment in housing associations and sought 
to establish and defend tenants’ rights (but notably no tenant representatives were 
appointed to the TSA). It should be stressed that, in line with the post-democracy 
thesis, that ministers were anxious to ensure that any new regulatory arrangements 
satisfied private investors (Xa forthcoming). The later role was also to be reinforced 
by a new, independent but government-funded organisation, the National Tenant 
Voice (NTV); although it must be said that the NTV did not originate with ministers. 
NTV was intended to empower tenants and protect their interests as a countervailing 
organisation to provider power, especially given the tension in TSA’s role. It was the 
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first national mechanism of representation for social tenants. They were to be 
represented, after an extensive process of tenant consultation overseen by the 
Department of Communities and Local Government, through a combination of 
regionally-nominated representatives and representatives from the national tenant 
organisations.  
 
Within its first two years the Coalition government abolished the NTV and TSA, 
allocated the TSA’s regulatory functions to the HCA and clipped the HCA’s powers 
and funding. Thus two important MoRs were removed leaving tenants with pre-
existing national organisations which are poorly resourced and not widely accepted as 
representative among either tenants or within government. Subsequently, Coalition 
government ministers have responded to the problems of housing affordability by 
removing lifetime tenure for social tenants, and defining social housing as a residual 
service rather than an entitlement. Meanwhile, nationally tenants have lost pathways 
to influence via the Labour party once the party lost power, although they had steadily 
been losing influence within the party over the last thirty years (Xa, forthcoming). 
This loss of influence reflected Labour leaders’ focus on the marginal voter in the 
South East and the decline of what was once a strong tenant presence in local Labour 
organisations. 
 
Conclusion   
The case study evidence does not support claims for a paradigmatic shift towards 
network governance. Neither does it support claims for a weakening of vertical 
linkages or a strengthening of horizontal linkages within, or across, service delivery 
chains in the England. Rather the evidence indicates that policymakers still resort to 
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bureaucratic and hierarchical structures to deliver those key services they value. It 
also underlines the need to refocus the study of public administration on critical 
questions of power, competing interests, mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion and 
contested claims to knowledge and expertise between levels in a delivery chain. In 
particular, post-democracy (Crouch 2004) helps frame the dilemmas confronting 
policymakers. For example, Labour ministers (although some ministers were more 
enthusiastic than others) did build an economic development delivery chain with the 
potential for being territorially redistributive, although it failed to provide those at the 
sub-central level with enough policy responsibilities, resources or legitimacy to 
anchor sub-central discretion effectively. At least in part, this failure reflected how 
ministers were caught between the need to promote the competitiveness of the UK, 
largely seen as about the South East, and regional redistributive objectives which 
promised less electoral and economic returns. The Conservative leadership, once in 
government, now face their own tensions between the interests of South East 
business, and housing developers, and those of their suburban electoral and local 
government support base. 
 
Some significant shifts in service delivery have occurred: (1) horizontal relationships 
have become, at least under Labour, more evident in various partnerships and official 
rhetoric, although not necessarily effective (Davies 2009); (2) extra-governmental 
organisations – in the private and nonprofit sectors – do play a significant role in 
service delivery in some structures of public policy making and delivery; and (3) 
regulatory-type controls are replacing direct bureaucratic service delivery in some 
services but, as in housing, simply tightening central control rather than freeing up 
local, frontline service providers. However, bureaucratic principles remain the means 
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of ensuring control and accountability even when ostensibly regulatory systems are 
put in place (as in social housing). Bureaucracies can be repressive but governmental 
bureaucracies also have a record of promoting redistributive policies and anchoring 
the representation of dependent groups. Counter-bureaucracies, too, have some 
potential to defend user interests such as those of social tenants. Meanwhile, those 
lower down within these structures, whether they are providers or service users, have 
limited organisational capacity and opportunities to ‘self-organise’ let alone challenge 
central control. 
 
Thus power remains highly centralised with the powers of key decision remaining at 
the centre along the lines of the ‘asymmetric power model’ (Marsh et al, 2003, Marsh 
2008). Central policymakers resort to extra-governmental providers to circumvent 
established producer groups within government structures, ‘governing through 
governance’ (Bache 2003). The Coalition government has abolished governmental 
layers with resolute centralism and used subcontractual relationships, as even Labour 
did, to impose change on delivery structures partly to anticipate intra-government, 
producer group intractability; although this exercise of power is partly obscured by 
the localist and voluntarist rhetoric of ‘New Localism’ and the ‘Big Society’. 
However, the increasing reliance on private sector organisations, and the interchange 
of staff between government and these organisations, is raising new and pressing 
questions for future public administration and management research. Firstly, how 
central policymakers seek to manage their political environments – how they manage 
the politics of representation and pathways to influence, distinguishing between those 
interests and groups which should and should not be represented in the delivery chain, 
how they manage or regulate marginal and dependent groups (Ingram et al., 2007; 
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Piven and Cloward 1971 and 1977), such as social tenants, and sometimes to 
undermine opposition from these groups and to claim legitimacy for service 
reductions from the wider public by stigmatising these groups (Xa, forthcoming). 
Secondly, whether and how new producer interest groups are crystallising on the 
margins of government – based around the interests of for-profit companies and, to a 
lesser extent, non-profit organisations. To what extent are central policymakers are 
able to act independently of these new interests or, as the post-democracy thesis 
implies, are they becoming subservient to them? 
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